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In Tradition and Reflection (p. 31) Professor Halbfass makes the important observation 
that the M¥måµså school of Vedic exegesis is not, not even in its own self-
understanding, an expression or manifestation of Vedic thought and life. He then goes 
on to ask a number of questions, among them the following: What is the relationship 
between philosophy and Vedic exegesis and apologetics in the M¥måµså? The 
remarkable fact is, as Halbfass observes on p. 30, that Íabara, Kumårila, and 
Prabhåkara, the most important thinkers of the school, do not try to derive their 
teachings on epistemology, ontology, categoriology, and the philosophy of language 
from the Veda. Apologetics plays therefore a major role in the formulation of many 
philosophical positions. This is true of the theory of svata˙pråmåˆya, the 'self-sufficient 
validity', 'self-validating authority' of valid, specifically Vedic, cognition, which, in 
Halbfass' opinion (p. 32), is obviously motivated by apologetic concerns. Yet Halbfass 
makes a point of stressing that this and other school positions make an important 
contribution to the philosophical debate of its time and beyond, especially in the hands 
of Kumårila, "the most important representative of classical M¥måµså thought and 
apologetics". 
The present article takes up once again the question of the relationship between 
philosophy and Vedic exegesis in the M¥måµså. It seems possible to go further than 
Halbfass in this respect, and to show that two of the fundamental tenets of M¥måµså 
philosophy — Halbfass (p. 30) speaks of "the central and symptomatic notions of the 
'self-evidence' or 'self-sufficient validity' (svata˙pråmåˆya) of valid cognition1 and of 
the 'authorlessness' (apauru∑eyatva) and 'eternity' (nityatva) of the Veda" — have an 
inherent connection with the M¥måµså method of Vedic exegesis. In order to show this, 
it will be necessary to leave philosophical questions aside for the time being, and to 
enter into some of the details [360] of the sometimes complicated exegetical discussions 
of the school. While doing so, we will confine our attention to the basic text of the 
school, Íabara's M¥måµsåbhå∑ya. 
Íabara's exegetical efforts do not infrequently concentrate on comparing two 
different interpretations of a Vedic statement. One of the two is in the end discarded, the 
other one is retained. The M¥måµså has formulated a number of criteria meant to be of 




help in deciding in such situations. These criteria do not interest us in themselves at 
present. We are more interested in the type of reasoning used to establish those criteria, 
and to choose between different interpretations in general. Here we find that Íabara 
sometimes uses the expressions 'nearest meaning' (saµnik®∑†a artha) and 'more remote 
meaning' (viprak®∑†a artha). Of these two, Íabara always gives preference to the 'nearest 
meaning'. He follows in this respect the M¥måµsåsËtra on which he comments. SËtra 
3.3.142 enumerates a number of factors that can play a role in the interpretation of a 
Vedic statement and adds that, in cases where several of these factors apply 
simultaneously, the ones figuring later in the enumeration are weaker than the earlier 
ones, because the meaning obtained with their help is  more remote 
(arthaviprakar∑åt). 
Consider, as a concrete example, the injunction "One [must] worship the 
gårhapatya [fire] with the Aindr¥".3 The Aindr¥ is a sacred formula which begins with 
the words: kadå ca na star¥r asi nendra saßcasi dåßu∑e.4 This formula contains the name 
Indra, which might be taken to indicate that it is to be used in order to worship the god 
Indra. The injunction, on the other hand, states clearly that the Aindr¥ must be used to 
worship the gårhapatya, which is a sacrificial fire. In other words, two conflicting 
interpretations present themselves. 
Íabara's Bhå∑ya discusses this question at length under sËtra 3.3.14. The 
position finally accepted is as follows. The injunction to worship the gårhapatya fire is 
explicit (pratyak∑a) and constitutes for this reason the closest interpretation. The 
formula kadå ca na etc. does not state explicitly that Indra is to be worshipped with it; 
this latter interpretation is therefore more remote and must be discarded.5 
Consider next the sacred formula: syonaµ te sadanaµ k®ˆomi gh®tasya dhårayå 
sußevaµ kalpayåmi; tasmin s¥dåm®te pratiti∑†ha vr¥h¥ˆåµ medha sumanasyamåna˙ "I 
make your seat agreeable, with a stream of clarified butter I make it very dear. Sit on it, 
establish yourself in the nectar of immortality, oh oblation of rice, being favourably 
disposed."6 Unlike the formula studied above, there is in this case no [361] injunction 
which specifies the context in which this formula is to be used. One must therefore be 
guided by its contents. But here there is a difficulty. The formula has two parts: the first 
part concerns the preparation of the seat, the second the placing of the sacrificial cake. 
Should the whole formula be used at both these occasions? Or should one use the first 
                                                                                                                                         
1 Taber (1992, p. 218 f.) argues “that svata˙ pråmåˆya lies at the very heart of M¥måµså thought.” 
2 M¥S 3.3.14: ßruti-li∫ga-våkya-prakaraˆa-sthåna-samåkhyånåµ samavåye påradaurbal-yam 
arthaviprakar∑åt. 
3 MS 3.2.4 (ed. v. Schroeder p. 20 l. 13): aindryå gårhapatyam upati∑†hate. 
4 MS 1.3.26; RV 8.51.7; etc. Geldner (1951: 374) translates: "Auch nicht einmal bist du eine unfruchtbare 
Kuh, nie stehst du für den Opferwilligen trocken." This translation skips the crucial word indra. 
5 A similar reasoning is presented under sËtra 5.4.1. 
6 TB 3.7.5.2-3, which has karomi instead of k®ˆomi. With k®ˆomi this formula is found MÍS 1.2.6.19. 




half during the preparation of the seat, the second half while the sacrificial cake is 
placed on it? Here, too, the answer depends on the relative 'proximity' of the different 
interpretations. The 'nearest' interpretation will eliminate the others. Which is the 
nearest interpretation in this case? For Íabara there is no doubt.7 The connection 
between the second half of the formula and the placing of the sacrificial cake is direct, 
more direct at any rate than the link between the first half of the formula and this 
activity. The second half refers to the placing of the cake, whereas the first half is 
syntactically connected with the second half, which in its turn refers to that activity. A 
similar reasoning applies to the relationship of the two halves to the preparation of the 
seat.8 
The Bhå∑ya  under sËtra 3.3.14 contains a number of further discussions relating 
to the relative priority of one out of two possible interpretations of a Vedic statement. 
This sËtra establishes, as a matter of fact, a number of principles of priority which are 
used throughout the Bhå∑ya. All these discussions have in common that one of two 
interpretations is discarded because it is less 'near' than its competitor. We shall not here 
study all these cases. The two examples which we have considered suffice to reveal a 
general exegetical principle of the M¥måµså: the correct interpretation of a Vedic 
statement is its most direct interpretation. The direct interpretation, we further learn, 
follows as far as possible what the text states explicitly, and avoids inferential and 
multi-layered arguments. 
There is an obvious 'psychological' or 'epistemological' dimension to these 
discussions, which however rarely becomes explicit. But sometimes Íabara gives a hint 
that he is aware of it. So at the end of his discussion of sËtra 3.3.14. Here we learn that 
in the case of competing interpretations, different notions are in competition. The 
difference between a correct and an incorrect notion is that the latter is followed by 
another notion to the extent that it is incorrect, whereas the former is not. 
The principle that the most direct interpretation is the correct one pervades many 
other discussions in Íabara's Bhå∑ya. For one thing, if we are to find the most direct 
interpretation of a Vedic statement, it must [362] exist and be unambiguous. This is not 
however evident in all cases. Take the meanings of individual Sanskrit words. Almost 
any Sanskrit word, as is testified by the dictionaries, has various meanings.9 Which is 
the 'direct' interpretation that we must choose? The M¥måµså takes a categorical 
position in this matter: each word has but one primary sense; the other meanings are 
derived from this primary sense. The primary sense is known from the word alone; 
                                                
7 On M¥S 3.3.14 (p. 255 f.). 
8 Under M¥S 2.1.46 Íabara shows that  this one sacred formula (mantra) consists of two sentences. 
9 One is here reminded of the following observation by Doniger and Smith, 1991: xxiii: "it has been said 
that every word in Sanskrit designates its basic meaning, the opposite of that, a word for an elephant, a 
name of God, and a position in sexual intercourse." 




secondary meanings are understood because of some connection with the primary sense 
which is understood first.10 
In concrete cases it is not always easy to decide which of two known senses is 
primary, which one secondary. Where there are Vedic passages that clearly use the term 
concerned in one of the two meanings, there is no difficulty. The word yava, for 
example, can refer to barley and to long pepper. The Vedic sentence "Where other 
plants wither, these [yava plants] stand up happily, as it were" shows that the meaning 
'barley' is primary in the Veda.11 Sometimes the Veda does not help to make the choice. 
Take the example of the word parvan. It is known right from the Himålaya down to 
Cape Comorin,12 Íabara reminds us, that this word is used in the sense 'time' and 
'combination'. Which of these is the primary sense? Etymological reflections point to 
'combination' as the primary sense. The meaning 'time' can be obtained from this 
primary sense.13 Different reasons are adduced to choose between the two meanings of 
the term caru, 'vessel' and 'oblation of rice', both of them "known from the Himålaya 
down to Cape Comorin". The details, and the outcome, of this discussion do not interest 
us at present.14 The presupposition which expresses itself in them interests us all the 
more: it is the principle that Vedic statements allow of an unambiguous and direct 
interpretation. 
Íabara's Bhå∑ya on M¥S 1.3.30-35 contains an interesting discussion on what 
exactly is denoted by words. Is it the shape (åk®ti) shared in common by all individuals 
designated by that word? Or is it an individual (vyakti) thus designated? Both are 
understood when a word (and Íabara obviously thinks here in the first place of generic 
terms, such as 'cow') is pronounced, but both cannot be designated (no doubt for the 
same reason as above, viz., that a word cannot have two 'meanings'). Only the shape is 
directly expressed. Íabara explains why in the following passage: "It is self-evident that 
an individual is understood when a word is pronounced. The distinction whether [the 
individual is understood directly] from the word or from the shape is not evident [to 
everyone]."15 [363] Íabara subsequently establishes that the individual is understood 
from the shape rather than from the word, by showing that an individual is known from 
the shape, even when no word is uttered; and where a word is uttered but the relevant 
shape is not understood, there no individual is understood either. In other words, what 
                                                
10 Cf. Íabara on M¥S 3.2.1: ya˙ ßabdåd evåvagamyate, sa prathamo 'rtho mukhya˙/ mukham iva bhavat¥ti 
mukhya ity ucyate/ yas tu khalu prat¥tåd arthåt kenacit saµbandhena gamyate, sa paßcådbhåvåj jaghanam 
iva bhavat¥ti jaghanya˙/ guˆasaµbandhåc ca gauˆa iti/. 
11 Íabara on M¥S 1.3.9. 
12 Or "up to the Himålaya and up to Cape Comorin", as Wezler (1992: 472) prefers to translate this 
expression. 
13 Íabara on M¥S 9.2.51-53. 
14 See Íabara on M¥S 10.1.34-44. 
15 Íabara on M¥S 1.3.33: tad etad åtmapratyak∑aµ yac chabda uccarite vyakti˙ prat¥yata iti/ kiµ ßabdåd 
utåk®ter iti vibhågo na pratyak∑a˙/ 




we understand directly from the word is the shape. This shape, in its turn, can bring to 
our mind an individual characterised by it. This means that the shape, rather than any 
individual, comes most immediately to our mind when hearing a word. And this means, 
in view of the principle under discussion, that words denote shapes rather than 
individuals.16 
Elsewhere in Íabara's Bhå∑ya a different answer is considered to the question as 
to which is the notion most directly communicated by words. According to an 
opponent, it is the notion of mere sound devoid of meaning. This position is clearly 
inspired by the principle we are studying. Words first communicate the notion of sound; 
the meaning which we understand from a word arises as a result of recognising the 
sound first. Ergo, words primarily communicate the notion of sound. It is obvious that 
this conclusion, though close to the general principle of exegesis of the M¥måµså, 
cannot be acceptable. Both the M¥måµsåsËtra (7.2.5) and Íabara's Bhå∑ya  reject it by 
stating that the connection between words and meanings is natural (autpattika). In other 
words, no extra step is required to get from hearing the sound to understanding its 
meaning. This way the exegetical principle of the M¥måµså is saved. One could also 
say that the belief that the words and meanings of the Sanskrit language have an 
inherent connection, is a consequence of the dogma that Vedic statements can be 
correctly and unambiguously interpreted by choosing the 'most direct' interpretation, 
that is, the interpretation which involves the minimum of mental or epistemological 
stages. 
This same principle allows us to understand other discussions in Íabara's 
Bhå∑ya, too. Some words express a meaning different from the one suggested by their 
parts. The word kußala is an example. The parts kußa + la explain the word as "he who 
cuts (låti) kußa grass". Yet kußala expresses the meaning 'skilful'. Íabara admits that the 
meaning 'skilful' can be explained as a derivative of the meaning 'who cuts grass'. Yet 
the meaning 'skilful' must be preferred, precisely because we understand the word in 
that sense. In other words, we arrive more directly at the meaning 'skilful'.17 This same 
type of reasoning applies even to words that are only used by barbarians.18 
[364] 
Direct interpretation determines what analysis to apply to the compound 
ni∑ådasthapati. At first sight two interpretations seem possible: "leader (sthapati) of the 
Ni∑ådas", or "leader who is a Ni∑åda". The Ni∑ådas constitute a non-Aryan tribe, who 
are not, therefore, allowed to participate in Vedic rites. Yet the ni∑ådasthapati is 
mentioned in the context of a Vedic sacrifice. The question is unavoidable whether this 
                                                
16 For an assessment of Íabara's argument, see Scharf, 1993. 
17 See Íabara on M¥S 6.7.22. 
18 Íabara on M¥S 1.3.10. 




leader is himself a Ni∑åda. The second analysis designates him as one, whereas the first 
analysis leaves the possibility open that he isn't. Íabara prefers none-the-less the second 
analysis. His reasoning is as follows: The part ni∑åda- in ni∑ådasthapati means 
primarily, and therefore most directly, 'Ni∑åda'. The meaning 'of the Ni∑ådas', which 
appears in the first interpretation, can only be arrived at secondarily.19 The exegetical 
principle that the most direct interpretation is to be accepted, decides therefore in favour 
of the meaning 'leader who is a Ni∑åda', and this in spite of the problems this 
interpretation brings about. 
It is easy to see that this same principle can be used to justify the belief that 
words in the Veda have the same meanings as in ordinary life. The very first sentences 
of Íabara's Bhå∑ya present this line of reasoning in connection with the interpretation of 
sËtras, but it is clear that the same applies to the interpretation of Vedic statements. The 
main weakness of any other position is that it entails superfluous effort (yatnagaurava). 
This argument derives its strength from the principle which we now know, and 
according to which the best and only acceptable interpretation is the most direct one, 
which is the one that implies minimal mental effort. Íabara on M¥S 1.3.30 states simply 
that there is no difference between words in the Veda and in ordinary life, because we 
do not notice a difference between them.20 
Attention has already been drawn to the psychological/epistemological 
dimension of many of the exegetical arguments. This dimension is rarely made explicit. 
An exception is the discussion of the injunction "one should perform the Darßa and the 
PËrˆamåsa sacrifices" (darßapËrˆamåsåbhyåµ yajeta).21 This injunction is incomplete: 
it does not specify how these sacrifices are to be performed. Indeed, Íabara calls this 
injunction "the beginning of an injunction" (vidhyådi), which needs an end. The 
required information is found in the section which prescribes adding fuel to the fire, etc. 
(agnyanvådhånådividhånakåˆ∂a.). The injunction forms one single statement with this 
section, which has been put next to it in the mind;  the resulting single statement is of 
the form "One should in this manner perform the Darßa and the PËrˆamåsa 
sacrifices".22 
[365] 
This proximity in the mind has to be treated with much caution, as we can learn 
from Íabara's discussion under sËtra 3.1.21. This discussion concerns the sections 
(anuvåka) 7 to 11 of Taittir¥ya Saµhitå 2.5. Sections 7 and 8 deal with the mantras 
called Såmidhen¥; section 9 deals with the Nivids; section 10 continues the discussion 
                                                
19 Íabara on M¥S 6.1.51. 
20 Íabara on M¥S 1.3.30: na te∑åm e∑åµ ca vibhågam upalabhåmahe. 
21 The origin of this quotation is obscure. See Garge, 1952: 125, 128, 136. 
22 Íabara on M¥S 8.1.2: ... vidhyådi˙ ... agnyanvådhånådividhånakåˆ∂ena ... buddhau 
saµnihitenaikavåkyatåµ yåti darßapËrˆamåsåbhyåµ yajetettham iti. 




of certain Såmidhen¥s. The question presents itself whether the sections that deal with 
the Såmidhen¥s can be understood together, thus constituting the context (prakaraˆa) for 
section 11. The idea is launched that sections 7, 8 and 10 can be understood "as a single 
statement" (ekavåkyatå) because the sections 7 and 8 come together with section 10 in 
the mind. This idea is rejected with the argument that these sections are separated 
from each other by another section which deals with a different subject. Where another 
subject is introduced, the earlier subject is no longer present in the mind. Here the 
opponent persists, and observes that one can recall the earlier subject through mental 
effort (dhyåna), etc. Íabara's reply is important: In that case the result is due to human 
understanding, and is no longer Vedic.23 
This last remark is very significant. It identifies the mind as a potential source of 
error in the correct interpretation of a Vedic statement. The correct interpretation must 
therefore involve an absolute minimum of participation of the mind. In fact, the most 
direct interpretation is precisely the one which involves the least participation of the 
mind. It is of course axiomatic for the M¥måµså that the perfect interpretation of a 
Vedic statement exists, and can be found. In other words, it is possible to reduce the 
participation of the mind to an absolute minimum. 
It is easy to see how this position can be extended so as to cover all forms of 
valid cognition. It then states that all forms of cognition are right, unless they have been 
interfered with. This, of course, is what came to be known under the name 
svata˙pråmåˆya. Schmithausen (1965: 158-59), while presenting the position of the 
V®ttikåra (whose comments on M¥S 1.1.4-5 are included in Íabara's Bhå∑ya; see 
Frauwallner, 1968: 24 ff.), observes correctly:  
 
Die wahre Erkenntnis ist also der Normalfall, der Irrtum aber das Abnorme, 
da er durch ein zusätzliches Moment, die Störung, bewirkt ist. D.h. alle 
Erkenntnis ist grundsätzlich wahr, kann jedoch ausnahmsweise durch 
Störungen verdorben werden. 
 
These disturbances (Störungen; do∑a) can very well come from the mind. 
Correct perception, the V®ttikåra observes, can fail to come about [366] because the 
mind is disturbed by hunger etc., or the sense-organ by the eye disease called timira 
etc., or the outer object by minuteness and the like.24 
                                                
23 Íabara on M¥S 3.1.21: avaidika˙ sa puru∑abuddhipËrvako våkyårtho bhavet. A parallel situation is 
discussed under M¥S 2.1.49. Of a sequence of three mantras only the first one has a verbal form; number 
two requires (but does not have) another verbal form; and number three requires the same verbal form as 
number one. According to Íabara, this verbal form can be supplied to the third mantra, but it is not the 
Vedic word that is supplied, but the identical secular word. 
24 Frauwallner, 1968: 26 l. 12-14: yadå k∑udådibhir upahataµ mano bhavati, indriyaµ vå timirådibhi˙, 
sauk∑myådibhir vå båhyo vi∑ayas, tato mithyåjñånam, anupahate∑u samyagjñånam. 




It will be clear that the notion of self-sufficient validity of valid cognition 
(svata˙pråmåˆya) and the exegetical principle identified in the preceding pages are 
closely related. Both try to identify, then to exclude disturbing influences from the 
process leading to valid cognition, and both start from the assumption that such 
identification and exclusion are indeed possible. Perception that arises from a causal 
complex which is free from disturbing factors is necessarily correct. In the same way, 
Vedic statements naturally (svata˙) (i.e., when there are no disturbances by more than 
basic human mental activity) give rise to an interpretation (i.e., understanding, 
cognition) that is as a result necessarily correct. The proclamation that this 
interpretation of a Vedic statement — i.e., the one in the production of which no 
disturbances play a role — is necessarily correct serves, no doubt, apologetic concerns. 
The belief, on the other hand, that an interpretation can — and should — be found that 
has arisen without disturbances, is a programmatic principle which determines how to 
interpret Vedic statements. Interpreting the Veda means identifying disturbing factors 
— such as the more than basic activity of the human mind — and eliminating them. 
Any interpretation that requires more participation of the mind than is strictly necessary, 
is no longer Vedic, it is due to human understanding. 
The purity of the Veda, then, is endangered by the activity of the human, or any 
other, mind. This conviction expresses itself in another fundamental dogma of the 
M¥måµså, too. For mental activity does not only threaten to play a role in the arising of 
the interpretation of a text; mental activity normally plays a role in its composition, too. 
The M¥måµså avoids this danger by denying that the Veda has been composed at all. 
The Veda has no author, and this is possible because it has no beginning in time. 
Eternality and authorlessness are therefore two sides of the same position. And this 
position is ultimately based on the belief that the purity of the Veda is endangered by 
contact with any mind, be it human or divine. 
In order to justify this position, the M¥måµså presents a theory of the inherent 
correctness of the word by itself, which can however be lost on account of the use made 
of it by human beings. The following passage explains this:  
[367] 
It is a contradiction to say '[the Vedic word] states' and 'incorrectly'. When one 
says 'it states', this means 'it makes known', that it is the cause that [the thing] is 
known. ... If, then, it is understood on the basis of an injunction that the 
Agnihotra results in heaven, how can one say that it is not like that? And if it is 
not like that, how can it be known? It is contradictory to know a thing that does 
not exist. ... With regard to a statement made by a human being, on the other 
hand, if it comes from a person who is trustworthy, or if it refers to the realm of 
the senses, it is not incorrect. But if it comes from an untrustworthy person, or if 




it does not refer to the realm of the senses, then it is produced by the human 
understanding [only] and is not a means of valid knowledge.25 
 
It goes without saying that the dogma of the authorlessness of the Veda, too, like the 
principle of interpretation discussed earlier, influences the way Vedic statements are 
interpreted. A text without beginning cannot, of course, refer to events that happened at 
any particular time.26 Íabara is aware of this, and explicitly refers to it at some places. 
There is, for example, a Vedic statement which says that the god Prajåpati extracted his 
omentum.27 Íabara discusses this statement and observes: "If a historical event were to 
be referred to, the Veda would be open to the charge of having a beginning."28 
Similarly, the Vedic statement "We grasped your right hand, o Indra"29, if taken 
literally, would be open to the same charge.30 Elsewhere (1.1.31) Íabara is obliged to 
give different interpretations to expressions such as pråvåhaˆi and auddålaki, which 
normally signify 'son of Pravåhaˆa' and 'son of Uddålaka'.31 
In cases like these the principle of the most direct interpretation and the dogma 
of the beginninglessness of the Veda are in conflict. For clearly, the most direct 
interpretation of the statement "Prajåpati extracted his omentum" is that Prajåpati, at 
some point of time, extracted his omentum. The principle of the most direct 
interpretation meets with difficulties in other situations, too. Some Vedic statements do 
not agree with our experience. Íabara gives the following examples: "The trees sat 
down for a sacrificial session"; "The snakes sat down for a sacrificial session"; "The old 
bull sings mad [songs]".32 Cases like these serve as justification to deviate in numerous 
cases from the most direct interpretation, and resort to a secondary interpretation 
instead. Secondary interpretations play a major role in M¥måµså.33 In the end most of 
the Veda is interpreted in this way by this school. This does not, however, change the 
fact that a secondary interpretation is only allowed in cases where the primary 
                                                
25 ÍBh 1.1.2 (Frauwallner, 1968: p. 16 l. 15 - p. 18 l. 5): viprati∑iddham idam abhidh¥ya-te 'brav¥ti ca 
vitathaµ ca' iti/ brav¥ti ity ucyate 'vabodhayati, budhyamånasya nimittaµ bha-vati iti/ .../ yadi ca 
codanåyåµ satyåm 'agnihotråt svargo bhavati' ity avagamyate, katham ucyate 'na tathå bhavati' iti/ atha 
na tathå bhavati, katham avabudhyate/ asantam artham avabudhyata iti viprati∑iddham/ .../ yat tu 
laukikaµ vacanaµ, tac cet pratyayitåt puru∑åd indriyavi∑ayaµ vå, avitatham eva tat/ athåpratyayitåt 
puru∑åd anindriyavi∑ayaµ vå, tat pu-ru∑abuddhiprabhavam apramåˆam/. 
26 Strangely enough, the rabbinical interpretation of the Hebrew canon does not seem to accept this 
inference: even though the scriptures are timeless, they do refer to historical events. See Böhl, 1991: 162. 
27 TS 2.1.1.4: sa åtmano vapåm udakkhidat. 
28 Íabara on M¥S 1.2.10: v®ttåntånvåkhyåne 'pi vidh¥yamåne ådimattådo∑o vedasya prasajyeta. 
29 RV 10.47.1 etc.: jag®bhmå te dak∑iˆam indra hastaµ. 
30 Íabara on M¥S 9.1.9: athaivam ucyate, tasyaitad vacanaµ yo g®h¥tavåµs tasya hastam iti/ ucyate/ 
naitad adhyavaseyam/ ådimattådo∑o vedasya prasajyate. 
31 Pollock (1989: 608) refers to this passage in an article that draws attention to the non-historical nature 
of much of Sanskrit literature, possible in imitation of the Veda. 
32 Íabara on M¥S 1.1.32: vanaspataya˙ sattram åsata; sarpå˙ sattram åsata; jaradgavo gå-yati mattakåni. 
None of these three citations seems traceable in the Veda as we know it. 
33 Not only in the M¥måµså. Fox (1991: 41) observes with regard to Biblical interpretation: "Unerring 
scripture requires the acceptance of allegory, the belief that a text may appear to say one thing while 
meaning another." 




interpretation is not possible for one reason or other. The statements that remain for 
direct interpretation are few indeed. Only Vedic statements that are not, and cannot be, 
in conflict with other [368] sources of knowledge are in the end retained. Such 
statements are the injunctions. The injunction, Íabara explains, is a part of the Veda 
which communicates something which is unknown by other means.34 
But even if, for practical reasons, only a minority of Vedic statements can be 
strictly interpreted according to the rule of interpretation expounded above, the general 
principle remains unaffected, according to which each Vedic statement allows of a most 
direct interpretation, which is independent of the mental activity of the person who 
"receives" this interpretation. 
The Veda, then, is not produced by a human mind (nor by any other mind for 
that matter), and nor should it be interpreted by a mind. Or rather, only those 
interpretations which reduce the interference of the mind to a minimum can be accepted 
as correct. In this way the Veda remains pure, not touched by any mind, both in its 
composition and in its interpretation. This purity of the Veda, however, is only possible 
if it is accepted that the Veda is eternal, i.e., without beginning, and secondly, that this 
corpus allows of a 'direct' interpretation. The first consequence became a central tenet in 
the M¥måµså world view. The second consequence, as I have tried to show, constituted 
a point of departure for philosophical developments and elaborations within the school. 
Seen in this way, the notions of the 'self-sufficient validity' of valid cognition 
and that of the 'authorlessness' of the Veda are more than just "motivated by apologetic 
concerns" (Halbfass p. 32). They find their basis in a fundamental attitude of the 
M¥måµså, one that is widely present in Íabara's Bhå∑ya, and which is also discernible 
in the earlier M¥måµsåsËtra. These notions are not, it is true, derived from the Veda 
itself. But given the central position assigned to Vedic injunctions by this school of 
exegesis, it is hard to see how the M¥måµså could borrow any theoretical notions from 
the Veda itself. These notions are, however, closely linked to the no doubt sincere 
concern of the thinkers of the school to maintain the purity of the Veda and to gain 
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